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Decentralisation and Accountability in War-to-Peace 
Transitions: The Case of Kosovo 
 
Markus Schultze-Krafti and Engjellushe Morinaii 
 
Abstract 
 
In spite of the scant evidence of a positive correlation between decentralisation and strengthened 
local development and governance, decentralisation has been promoted as a tool to consolidate 
peace and rebuild states in countries emerging from violent conflict, especially in settings torn 
apart by ethnic and other identity-based cleavages. A key difficulty decentralisation has faced in 
many non-conflict settings is related to the challenge of instituting effective mechanisms of 
accountability. This difficulty is compounded in war-to-peace transitions. Using Kosovo as our 
case study, we highlight the risk of negative trade-offs between what we call the ‘political’ 
(peace-building) and ‘functional’ (state-building) dimensions of decentralisation. While quite 
successful in terms of mitigating tensions between the Albanian majority and Serb minority, 
decentralisation has contributed little to enhancing cooperation and trust between the two 
communities and improving local governance. Weak accountability – both formal and social – 
needs to be addressed to conclude Kosovo’s war-to-peace transition.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Often perceived as an effective vehicle to generate socioeconomic development and accountable, 
democratic governance, decentralisation has for a long time featured prominently in development 
strategies. Since the end of the Cold War, it has also been promoted and used quite extensively in 
attempts to consolidate peace and rebuild states in countries emerging from violent conflict. This 
is puzzling because there is little evidence that decentralisation has actually (a) resulted in 
improved service delivery, economic development and local governance in ‘normal’, non-conflict 
development contexts; and (b) helped overcome the drivers and legacies of violent conflict where 
it has occurred, and build capable and democratic states, particularly in societies shot through by 
ethnic and other identity-based cleavages. The specialized literature shows that one of the key 
challenges of decentralisation is associated with the difficulty of instituting effective 
accountability, both locally and between the local and central levels of government. We suggest 
that this difficulty is compounded in countries that are transitioning out of armed conflict, where 
decentralisation is used simultaneously as both a tool to consolidate peace and rebuild public 
authority and states. 
 
Using Kosovo as a case study, this article examines the challenges of decentralisation reforms in 
peace-building contexts. Given the centrality of accountability as both a fundamental goal of, and 
prerequisite for, effective decentralisation, we ask (a) why it appears to be particularly difficult to 
institute accountability mechanisms in such contexts; and (b) what the existence of accountability 
deficits imply for the prospects of consolidating peace and rebuilding public authority in 
countries emerging from internal armed conflict, and where decentralisation reforms are a key 
element of broader peace-building strategies. Our analysis focuses on formal, state-led 
mechanisms of horizontal and vertical accountability, such as elections and institutional checks 
and balances, but also tangentially incorporates some elements of the more recent debate about 
social, citizen-driven accountability initiatives like public information campaigns designed to 
monitor public officials and local service delivery.     
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These questions are informed by field research we carried out in 2012 and 2013 on Kosovo’s 
decentralisation process and local governance reforms in the wake of the 1998-99 war (involving 
forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and a 
major international military intervention under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, NATO), the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. We found a widespread 
sense among Kosovars (both ethnic Albanians and Serbs) and international donors that 
decentralisation was not living up to expectations. Among the key concerns that were expressed 
by central and local government officials, members of political parties and civil society 
organizations, academics and some international donors was that Kosovo still lacked effective 
accountability mechanisms. While it was generally recognized that decentralisation has helped 
reduce tensions and mitigate the potential for a renewed outbreak of violence between Kosovo 
Albanians and Serbs, there was much less enthusiasm about the performance of the decentralized 
system of government and governance in terms of improving the delivery of local public services 
and goods; and almost no indication that the two ethnic communities were interested in, and 
trying to, rebuild relationships of cooperation and trust. 
 
The article starts with a brief discussion of the relationship between decentralisation and 
accountability, which we extend to countries undergoing war-to-peace transitions. We then 
illustrate our argument in reference to the case of post-independence Kosovo, providing a 
succinct analysis of the political context in which decentralisation was pursued as both a means to 
consolidate peace and build a new, sovereign state under international supervision. Here, we 
distinguish between what we call the ‘political’ and ‘functional’ dimensions of decentralisation. 
Based on this analysis, we examine some of the features of what we suggest amounts to nothing 
less than a serious accountability deficit in post-independence Kosovo which risks undermining 
both the goal of consolidating peace and building effective, accountable local governance. 
Summarizing the presented argument, our conclusion highlights that more research is needed to 
understand how formal and social accountability mechanisms could be strengthened in Kosovo 
and what insights the case of Kosovo offers for future comparative research on decentralisation 
and accountability in peace-building contexts. 
  
2. Decentralisation, accountability and war-to-peace transitions 
 
Decentralisation - both as a means to achieving socio-economic development and improving 
public service delivery and as an end to promoting the basic principles of democratic governance 
(Cheema 2007) - has for a long time commanded interest among the international development 
community. Originally conceived in rather technical terms as a way to deconcentrate hierarchical 
government structures and bureaucracies, in the ‘mid-1980s, the concept was broadened to 
include political power sharing, democratization, and market liberalization’ (Cheema and 
Rondinelli 2007:2). Subsequently, after the end of the Cold War and amidst the rise of the good 
governance agenda, ‘decentralization [became] seen as a way of opening governance to wider 
public participation through civil society organizations’ (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007:3). 
Usefully described as referring to the ‘territorial distribution of power’ (Smith 1985:1), 
decentralisation - administrative, political, fiscal and economic – has taken different forms ‘along 
a continuum which represents the varying levels of decentralisation associated with different 
organizational and constitutional arrangements’, ranging from ‘complete independence to 
complete integration’ (Smith 1985:12). 
 
Among the basic assumptions that have guided the design and implementation of decentralisation 
are that it helps to ‘accelerate economic development, increase political accountability, and 
enhance public participation in governance’ (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007:7). Decentralisation 
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has also been perceived as instrumental for breaking ‘bottlenecks in hierarchical bureaucracies 
and assist local officials and the private sector to cut through complex procedures and get 
decisions made and implemented more quickly’ (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007:7). By promoting 
greater political representation of diverse political, ethnic and religious groups decentralisation is 
furthermore presumed to contribute to mitigating the risk of compromising the unity of the state. 
As we discuss below, this last point is of particular importance in post-conflict settings. 
 
Yet there is surprisingly little evidence showing that decentralisation has actually contributed to 
achieving these important goals. A review of the specialized literature finds that ‘there is a vast 
chasm between the benefits that proponents of decentralisation have claimed that reforms can 
have on service delivery, economic development and social cohesion and the reality, according to 
empirical research’ (Scott 2009:5). Indeed, it has been shown that the ‘relationships between 
decentralization and various development variables have more often than not been negative’ 
(Cheema and Rondinelli 2007:8). Among the main reasons that are cited to explain this gap 
between theory and reality are that decentralisation may increase the risk of elite capture of local 
governments and result in the strengthening of informal patronage networks and patron-client 
relationships; that local governments may be unable to raise sufficient financial resources to 
provide services effectively; that decentralisation can entail the loss of economies of scale; and 
that there may be a heightened risk of corruption and the misuse of public authority and resources 
at the local government level (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Cheema 2007; Cheema and 
Rondinelli 2007; Scott 2009).       
 
In many developing countries these problems have been associated with the difficulty to institute 
effective vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, such as through regular (free and 
fair) elections and functioning institutional checks and balances, respectively.iii This constitutes 
nothing short of a dilemma because more and stronger accountability is both one of the 
fundamental goals of decentralisation, which aims to increase the capacity of citizen to hold local 
government officials to account, and a prerequisite for effective decentralisation. Decentralisation 
thus faces the challenge of seeking to strengthen accountability by bringing decision-making 
closer to local communities while at the same time, to be effective, it is dependent on the 
commitment on the part of local leaders and citizens to accountability as well as on the existence 
of local capacity to exercise it. Yet such commitment and capacity may well be elusive. As 
Pranab Bardham and Dilip Mookherjee explain,  
 
‘decentralization is unlikely to be a universal panacea for problems of accountability. 
[…] Local democracy requires a set of prerequisites, including an educated and 
politically aware citizenry, an absence of high inequality in economic or social status that 
inhibits political participation of the poor or of minorities, a prevalence of law and order, 
the conduct of free and fair elections according to a constitutional setting that prevents 
excessive advantage to incumbents, effective competition between political candidates or 
parties with long-term interests, the presence of reliable information channels to citizens 
(for example, from an active, independent media), and the presence of oversight 
mechanisms both formal (legislatures, judiciary, independent auditors) and informal 
(such as civil society organizations)’ (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006:9).           
 
The fate of decentralisation therefore hinges to a significant extent on the existence of an 
environment conducive to the exercise of accountability. Yet in development contexts ‘both 
vertical and horizontal forms of accountability have [often] been found to be unsatisfactory on 
many counts (e.g. inadequate electoral processes, insufficient checks and balances instituted by 
the state, secrecy laws, lack of entry points for citizens, particularly of marginalized groups)’ 
(UNDP 2010:9).  
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In recognition of these problems the debate has more recently been broadened out to not only 
focus on ‘formal’, ‘state-driven’ and ‘top-down’ mechanisms but also on ‘social’, ‘citizen-led’ 
and ‘bottom-up’ accountability initiatives. Social accountability has been defined as comprising 
vertical, non-electoral mechanisms of ‘control of political authorities that [rest] on the actions of 
an array of citizens’ associations and movements and the media. The actions of these groups 
monitor public officials, expose governmental wrongdoing, and can activate the operation of 
horizontal agencies. Social accountability employs both institutional and noninstitutional tools’ 
(Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006:10).  
 
While the emergence of such initiatives has been observed and documented in a growing number 
of developing countries and while generally their (potential) usefulness has been presumed, there 
is no consensus about the impact of social accountability mechanisms on governance, public 
service delivery and development. In effect, recent research suggests that ‘social accountability in 
the form of demand side pressures by itself is unlikely to be successful. Successful cases rely 
heavily on reforms or support from the supply side [of accountability] in the form of reformist 
bureaucrats, alliances across the public-private divide and changes in the broader incentives 
within which the public sector operates’ (Joshi and Houtzager 2012:153). Furthermore, it is not 
yet fully understood why citizens come together to demand social accountability in some 
circumstances and not in others, and who engages in these processes (Joshi 2008).  
 
Against the backdrop of this brief discussion of the interdependencies between decentralisation 
and accountability, and the challenges associated with them, it is puzzling that in the past two 
decades decentralisation has quite consistently also been promoted – and used - as a tool to 
consolidate peace and re-build states in the wake of internal war (Brinkerhoff 2011). The 
conditions in countries that are emerging from violent conflict are arguably even more adverse 
than in ‘normal’ development settings. Societies transitioning out of conflict are fractured and 
polarized, state institutions have been destroyed or become militarized, and accountability is 
severely limited or absent, to name but a few of the grave legacies of violent conflict. This 
notwithstanding, strategies to build peace and reconstruct states in countries that witnessed civil 
and ethnic conflict have frequently incorporated decentralisation as part of other institutional 
measures to enable power-sharing among the contending groups and protect the civil and political 
rights of minorities. 
 
Theoretically, decentralisation can be an element of approaches to build peace through both 
‘liberalization’ and ‘institutionalization’, to use the terminology developed by Roland Paris (Paris 
2004). However, containing different conceptions of the role and significance of accountability in 
the peace-building process, we suggest that the two approaches are not equally suited to create the 
necessary conditions to ‘make decentralisation work’; i.e. strengthen local service delivery and 
economic development and promote the principles of accountable, democratic governance.  
 
Accountability is a key concern of those who emphasise the centrality of democratic institutions 
and politics (especially free and fair elections), the rigorous protection of human rights, and a 
strong rule of law in war-to-peace transitions. These goals are perceived to depend fundamentally 
on the creation of both vertical and horizontal mechanisms through which citizens can hold 
decision-makers and public officials to account. In contrast, proponents of a narrower, stability-
oriented approach to peace-building are likely to pay less attention to issues of accountability, 
especially in the early post-conflict period. Their principal aim is to maintain a stable security 
environment and keep the contending parties separate and spoilers at bay. In this conception, 
accountability acquires its true significance as part of a process of instituting representative 
democracy and a free market economy only once the peace has been secured. 
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In practice, the stability-oriented, ‘realist’ approach has tended to trump the ‘liberal’ conception 
in what often – and inevitably – have been challenging, messy and (self)- interested engagements 
by the ‘international community’ to end violent conflict and rebuild war-torn societies and states. 
This has important implications for the effectiveness of decentralisation as a peace-building tool. 
To begin with, introducing a decentralized system of government can promote the ‘freezing’ of 
(perceived or real) animosities and incompatibilities between different ethnic or other identity-
based groups. As different communities are ‘accommodated’ within separate administrative and 
territorial entities (municipalities), the incentives for integration and inter-ethnic cooperation may 
be reduced. More intransigent and vocal elements among the majority groups may be incentivized 
to continue to bolster their political power through extremist discourses and other hostile acts. 
Indeed, it has been noted that even the most carefully designed decentralisation framework cannot 
fully prevent the reemergence of inter-ethnic or identity-based violence (Roeder and Rothchild 
2005). Pursuing decentralisation in post-conflict settings therefore carries the risk of becoming a 
self-defeating undertaking in terms of consolidating peace.iv  
 
The problems of decentralisation in war-to-peace transitions are compounded, as discussed 
earlier, by the fact that it cannot work properly and deliver on its promises of strengthening local 
service delivery and development in the absence of sufficiently strong accountability 
mechanisms. One important issue in this respect is that peace-building and stabilization missions 
leave deep footprints in the countries of intervention. While the mandates of the interventions and 
of the international actors tasked with implementing them differ from case to case, accountability 
often runs upwards from the central host governments to the international agencies and donors, 
and not downwards to communities and citizens. Further, for a number of reasons, including 
standard immunities enjoyed by international personnel deployed to crisis or conflict settings, 
international officials can commonly not be held accountable by local authorities because they are 
answerable to their headquarters and the governments of troop contributing and donor countries 
(Caplan, c2005; Visoka 2012).  
 
In these situations the conditions are not given for local leaders to commit to being answerable to 
citizens and public control and oversight institutions, which, at any rate, are likely to be 
politicised and quite unable to perform their functions. As we discuss below in relation to 
Kosovo, the aim of local officials, particularly mayors, will be to strengthen their own standing 
vis-à-vis their political party hierarchy, the central government and the international stabilisation 
apparatus. Common citizens, in turn, have to navigate carefully the many pitfalls that exist in 
post-conflict settings. Potentially caught in a ‘no war, no peace’ situation on account of ethnic-
territorial decentralisation - among other issues like persisting geopolitical tensions, pervasive 
clientelism and the proliferation of organized criminality - they are locked into relationships of 
dependence with the leaders of ‘their’ group and have little, if any, recourse to functioning public 
mechanisms of accountability and redress. While the concept of social accountability has recently 
started to gain some currency in debates about peace-building and state reconstruction, in light of 
the above it has to be recognized that the emergence of such initiatives faces significant 
constraints in post-conflict settings shot through by deep ethnic and other cleavages (Lakhani 
2013; UNDP 2010). 
 
3. Decentralisation in post-independence Kosovo 
 
Following North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military action in April-June 1999, which 
led to the end of the 18-month ‘Kosovo war’ involving forces of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) deployed under UN Security Council resolution 1244. UNMIK was mandated to 
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administer the territory of Kosovo by means of an interim civilian administration and oversee the 
transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to a set of new institutions, which 
would substantially enhance the autonomy of the people of Kosovo vis-à-vis the Serbian 
government in Belgrade. 
 
After years of international community-led ‘status negotiations’ between Pristina and Belgrade - 
triggered by a renewed outbreak of heavy ethnic rioting in Kosovo in 2004 - former Finnish 
President Martti Athisaari tabled the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement 
or, in short, ‘Athisaari Plan’. Although the plan was ultimately not endorsed by the UN Security 
Council, it prepared the ground for Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 
2008, which unsurprisingly has not been recognized by Serbia.v Serving as the blueprint for 
Kosovo’s new constitution, the plan provided the framework for progressing decentralisation 
(which had started under the international administration in 2003) and other far-reaching 
institutional and economic reform measures in the post-independence period. Significantly, the 
Athisaari proposal foresaw the creation of several new municipalities with special competencies 
in order to protect the rights and identity of Kosovo’s minority ethnic groups, including its Serb 
communities. 
 
Following the adoption of Kosovo’s constitution in June 2008, the Laws on Local Self-
Government (LLSG), Local Elections (LLE), Administrative Municipal Boundaries (LAMB), 
and Local Government Finance (LLGF) were approved by the new state’s legislative – the 
Kosovo Assembly. Four new Serb-majority municipalities with ‘extended competencies’ were 
created in the wake of the local elections of 2009 (Gracanica, Partes, Ranilug and Klokot) and 
one, Novo Brdo, was extended. The chances are that following an agreement between Pristina 
and Belgrade, which was brokered by the European Union and entered into effect in April 2013, 
decentralisation could now also contribute to resolving the stand-off between Kosovo and Serbia 
over four Serb municipalities in the north of Kosovo (Zvecan, Zubin Potok, Leposavic and 
Mitrovica North).vi Since independence, they had de facto been outside of Pristina’s control.vii In 
November 2013, local elections were held in all of the country’s 36 municipalities, including for 
the first time in the north. 
 
There is little doubt that this ‘political’ dimension of decentralisation has been the main driver of 
the process. It has had strong backing from the main international players in Kosovo and the 
Western Balkans, i.e. the EU, the U.S. and the UN. A core part of the international peace-building 
effort, decentralisation was used as a ‘tool’ to attract the Serbian minority community in Kosovo 
to accept and adhere to the institutions of the new government in Pristina by creating Serb-
majority municipalities with special competencies. Furthermore, decentralisation and the 
cooperation of the Serb community with Kosovo’s new institutions were conceived as a means to 
help diminish the influence and presence of ‘parallel’, Belgrade-funded government and public 
service structures for the Serb community in the country. The stance of the major donors in 
Kosovo has consistently been that ‘decentralisation has to work; we will not let the Serbs of 
Kosovo alone’.viii  
 
Yet decentralisation has not been a political project to which Kosovo’s Albanian majority and 
political elites would have related easily and over which they would have had significant control. 
In effect, Kosovo’s authorities seem to have adopted the position that accepting the Athisaari 
Plan, including its core provisions on decentralisation, was the price they had to pay for 
independence from Serbia. Six years after independence, Kosovars and international donors are 
finding that decentralisation is not living up to expectations. We suggest that this disenchantment 
is related to the hybrid nature of the reform, which was designed by the international community 
to serve foremost ‘political’ (peace-building) but also ‘functional’ (state-building) purposes. 
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Enabling citizens to hold their locally elected mayors and municipal assemblies to account has 
been a core aim of the ‘functional’ dimension of decentralisation. However, as we discuss in the 
next section,ix achieving this goal has not been straightforward. By giving extensive powers to 
municipal mayors the new decentralisation framework actually established limits to the exercise 
of local accountability.x   
 
 
3.1. Key features of ‘functional’ decentralisation in Kosovo 
Kosovo’s decentralisation framework stipulates the transfer of many competencies to the local 
level, providing, in line with the Athisaari Plan and Kosovo’s constitution, for differentiated 
treatment of municipalities where the Serb community is in the majority. ‘Own’ competencies 
apply across all municipalities and range from local economic development and the provision and 
maintenance of public services and utilities, including water supply and waste management, to 
the provision of public pre-primary, primary and secondary education and public primary health 
care.xi In addition to municipalities ‘own’ competencies, the central government may delegate 
responsibility to municipalities regarding, inter alia, cadastral records, business registration and 
forestry protection.xii ‘Enhanced’ competencies apply only to municipalities in which the Kosovo 
Serb community is in the majority, and they cover secondary health care, university education, 
culture and the selection of local station police commanders. It is noteworthy that the LLSG 
stipulates that the exercise of the ‘enhanced’ competencies is subject to the monitoring by the 
central government, which is not the case with ‘own’ competencies over which municipalities 
have ‘full and exclusive’ powers. 
 
A particular characteristic of Kosovo’s decentralized system of government is that it gives 
extensive powers to the municipal executive, the mayor, who is directly elected by the municipal 
electorate in a majority rule system.xiii The mayor is the figurehead in local governance, as he/she 
represents and acts on behalf of the municipality, conducting all financial administration 
(including proposing and executing the municipal budget) (LLSG, article 58). The mayor is 
charged with organizing the establishment, staffing and financial management of the municipal 
administration (including the appointment of the municipal directors), directing municipal policy, 
and reporting to the municipal assembly on the economic and financial situation of the 
municipality. The mayor must provide any information that the supervisory authority (central 
government) requests, including all acts adopted by the municipal assembly(LLSG, article 78.1). 
In practice, it is the mayor and the municipal directors who keep close contact with the central 
government and the relevant line ministries, seeking to influence, for instance, the budget process 
which is controlled by the central government. 
 
Mayors are the key actors in managing the often difficult relations between the municipal and 
central levels of government, both as individual elected officeholders and through the Association 
of Kosovo Municipalities (AKM). While mayors work the higher political contacts in the central 
government and their respective political parties, the municipal directors are dealing directly and 
on a constant basis with their respective line ministries in order to resolve specific issues. AKM 
fulfills the crucial role of a broker in municipal-central government relations. As a NGO funded 
by voluntary membership fees from the municipalities and international donor support, AKM’s 
mission is ‘to create efficient, sustainable and democratic local government through high quality 
performance in providing services according to the needs of citizens. In its founding documents, 
the AKM claims to dedicate its activities to fostering good governance at the local level, 
harmonizing the division of labor between central and local authorities, and advocating for 
decentralized governance that avoids unnecessary parallelism and centralist tendencies’.xiv  
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AKM appears to be generally well regarded among municipal authorities (as well as the central 
government) for the lobbying in national legislative processes it undertakes is seen as a 
significant contribution to the strengthening of the municipalities and local governance.xv 
However, a recent assessment report on the AKM stated that some international donors believe 
that the association ’is occasionally used as an instrument by municipality mayors to advance 
their narrow interest’ and that there is a tendency to ‘make the AKM an organization of mayors 
and less of municipalities’ (UBO Consulting 2011:37). The chairs of municipal assemblies are 
not represented in the AKM and there are no ‘independent’ citizen or CSO representatives. As 
has been observed by the International Civilian Office (ICO), there is a need to ‘balance the 
overpowering of municipal mayors’ and, by implication the political parties, which puts the AKM 
at risk of becoming politicized (UBO Consulting 2011:37). For instance, if the ruling party does 
not want support amendments to a certain law for political reasons it is likely that the 
amendments will not happen.xvi 
 
Although by law the ‘highest representative body of the municipality’ (LLSG, article 35), the 
municipal assembly plays a rather subordinate role in local governance. Our research revealed 
that the mayors are generally more visible and better known among the electorate than the 
members of municipal assemblies.xvii In part this is so because assembly members are elected 
through an open party-list proportional representation system (LLE, article 7), while mayors are 
elected directly through majority rule. Further, it is usually the mayors who have a ‘direct 
connection’ to the party leadership, not the members of municipal assemblies. The 
responsibilities of the assembly range from approval of the budget and investment plans and the 
adoption, amendment or repeal of the rules of procedure and municipal regulations to the 
establishment of the assembly committees, naming and renaming of roads and making inter-
municipal and intra-municipal agreements (LLSG, article 40). Among its most important 
functions is arguably approving the municipal budget. However, in practice this function does not 
carry much meaning and significance. In municipalities where the chair of the assembly (elected 
by the assembly from among its members) belongs to the same political party as the mayor the 
chances are that the municipal legislative fails to exercise rigorous scrutiny of the actions and 
decisions of the municipal executive. 
 
Kosovo’s decentralisation framework does not contain an administrative-political tier below the 
level of the municipality. According to the LLSG, the MLGA may ‘issue instructions’ on the 
arrangements between the municipality and the villages (LLSG, article 34.3). Villages can carry 
out activities that are within the responsibility of the municipal government if they are given 
permission. Municipalities must provide sufficient resources for this (LLSG, article 34.2). While 
there are village councils and leaders as well as a coordinator in the mayor’s office charged with 
liaising with village representatives, their selection, functions and competencies are not defined 
by law; their work is not remunerated; and there are no specific lines in the municipal budgets for 
the village councils/leaders.  
 
Relations between municipalities and villages are therefore rather informal and may be subject to 
mediation by political party membership, i.e. relations between the mayor and the village leaders 
are likely to be closer if they are members of the same political party.xviii In some instances, 
village leaders are appointed by the mayor after consultation with the village councils, in others 
they are ‘selected’ by residents. The influence of village leaders on local decision-making is, 
however, mostly limited to representing villages in consultations about matters related to the 
municipal budget and infrastructure investment. These consultations are commonly arranged in a 
‘top-down’ fashion by the mayors. The municipal assembly committees, whose members are 
elected by the municipal assembly, tend to exercise a merely formal role.  
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Finally, according to the LLSG, any person or organization with a particular interest in the 
municipality may attend public meetings, and representatives of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) can attend consultative committees and ‘may submit proposals, conduct research and 
provide opinions on municipal assembly initiatives in accordance with the Municipal Statute’ 
(LLSG ,articles 68.1. and 73.2). However, the number of active civil society organizations 
(including NGOs, professional associations, social membership organizations) in Kosovo is still 
quite low. The most visible and vocal ones are based in Pristina, and overall they enjoy better 
access to international donor funds than civil society organizations (CSOs) in smaller and/or rural 
municipalities. In Viti and Peja, the authors found that there was a sense among local CSO 
representatives that the decentralisation process is not yet fully understood by citizens, that 
‘governance sits in Pristina’ (Viti), and that CSOs do not play a significant part in municipal 
affairs (Peja). By the same token, it was pointed out that the decentralisation process needs to be 
taken further, in particular with respect to including village leaders and councils more, and in a 
more formal way, in local governance arrangements by providing them specific competencies.xix 
 
 
4. Decentralisation and Kosovo’s accountability deficit 
 
Well into the second year after the end of ‘internationally supervised independence’ in 2012 there 
are concerns that the country still lacks sufficiently strong accountability mechanisms. Interviews 
with representatives of the governing Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the political 
opposition, NGOs, citizen groups and international donors revealed that a broad range of political 
and social sectors in the country feel that the checks on the exercise of public authority are strong 
on paper but weak in practice.xx As one senior government official put it, ‘we have the 
[decentralized and democratic] system in place but we need to make it work better through 
strengthened accountability’.xxi  
 
Yet these concerns about Kosovo’s accountability deficit are usually framed in the sense that 
without more effective accountability the country will be unable to address serious problems of 
poor service delivery, rampant unemployment, weak economic growth and pervasive corruption 
(European Commission 2011; IKS 2010). While these are certainly important issues, less often is 
it explicitly recognized that stronger accountability is also a necessary prerequisite for Kosovo’s 
decentralized system of government to be able to promote the basic principles of democratic 
governance and help mend the rift between the country’s Albanian majority and Serb minority. 
The post-independence creation of the Serb-majority municipalities with ‘enhanced 
competencies’ and the 2013 agreement between Pristina and Belgrade on the status of the four 
Serb municipalities in the north have helped to allay fears that the rights, security and welfare of 
the Serb minority in Kosovo would not be protected. These measures have also contributed to 
keeping the tense relations between Kosovo and Serbia manageable. 
 
However, the international community-led strategy to appease Serbia and accommodate 
Kosovo’s Serb minority through the creation of municipalities with special competencies as part 
of a complex decentralisation process has resulted in an artificial and potentially volatile 
situation. The challenges ahead are formidable. If left unaddressed they stand to undermine the 
prospects of inter-ethnic cooperation and peaceful coexistence of Albanians and Serbs in a 
decentralized Kosovo, the country’s socioeconomic development and, ultimately, its accession to 
the European Union.xxii  
 
With respect to formal accountability, our research shows that among the key issues that need to 
be addressed is the dominant position of the mayor in municipal governance and in managing the 
relations between the municipalities and the central government (including through AKM). This 
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involves strengthening the capacity of municipal assembly members to demand accountability 
from the mayor and the municipal administration. Also, beyond the top-down, token recognition 
of their role in local governance and participation in municipal affairs village leaders and councils 
and local CSOs would have to be enabled and empowered to partake in a more meaningful and 
effective way in municipal decision-making. This is increasingly being recognized, including by 
some international donors who deplore the lack of close-enough cooperation between the 
municipal institutions and CSOs and fear that projects to strengthen citizen participation may 
therefore not be sustainable in the longer-term.xxiii             
 
While strengthening formal accountability mechanisms would require amendments to the existing 
legal framework - such as in relation to the LLSG’s provisions on the competencies of the mayor, 
the municipal assembly and village leaders - the issue is more complex than that.xxiv The extent of 
the problem has been captured as one where the ‘creation and reform of political institutions that 
comprise the post-1999 state-building process has concentrated on formal institutions, with the 
aim of developing a liberal democratic structure underpinned by norms such as accountability, 
transparency and other [elements] of good governance’ (KLGI 2014:5). Yet ‘behind the construct 
of the formal state, alternative informal structures and logics operate to determine politics [and 
governance] in Kosovo’ (KLGI 2014:5). In this hybrid political order ‘formal and informal 
systems […] are not separate but co-exist and interact’ (KLGI 2014:6). Importantly, relations 
between the electorate and political leaders are structured essentially by informal patron-client 
exchanges and transactions, not by formal and transparent procedures that would be subject to 
regular public oversight and scrutiny (Democracy for Development Institute 2013).  
 
Kosovo’s political parties are at the heart of this clientelistic system. It, involves national ‘super 
patrons’ (party bosses and central government officials), local ‘patrons’ (local politicians, mayors 
and municipal directors) who strive to amass votes for their respective ‘super patrons’, and 
common citizens in their capacity of patronage-dependent voters (KLGI 2014). In what has been 
aptly described as a system of ‘reverse accountability’, local politicians hold citizens to account, 
i.e. make sure that they voted for them and their party, not the other way round. At the same time, 
there is a marked tendency among politicians to see themselves as being accountable to the 
‘internal hierarchy of the party they represent’ (KLGI 2014:19), not to the public (Democracy for 
Development Institute 2013).  
 
Initially spurred by UNMIK’s problematic policy of accommodating the leaders of Kosovo’s 
main post-war political parties by co-opting them into power-sharing arrangements, over time 
clientelism took root in the public administration and the civil service (Democracy for 
Development Institute 2013). It cuts across ethnic lines and equally affects common Kosovo-
Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs. Both groups are heavily dependent on employment in the public 
sector and other ‘favours’ handed down to them from political party bosses, local and central 
government officials and, in the case of the Kosovo-Serbs, the Serbian government in 
Belgrade.xxv 
 
Confirming the observation discussed earlier that decentralisation is not a panacea for addressing 
problems of accountability (and by extension problems of local governance and poor service 
delivery), the case of Kosovo also shows that decentralisation in and of itself does not promote 
the bridging of ethnic and other identity cleavages that were at the root of the armed conflict. 
Arguably, this is the case, at least partly, because in the absence of sufficiently strong 
accountability mechanisms the prospects for cooperation, dialogue and the building of 
relationships of trust between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority are slim. On both sides 
the perception prevails that in the new state public institutions do not function in an accountable 
and transparent way, the rule of law is not being upheld, and common citizens are dependent on 
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the favours they receive from local patrons who themselves are locked into patronage 
relationships with their bosses in Pristina or Belgrade.xxvi 
 
Under these circumstances, there are few, if any, incentives for Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-
Serbs to cooperate with one another. Recent research shows that ‘ethnic groups are still highly 
separated in their daily lives and only very few initiatives cross-cutting ethnic affiliation exist in 
civil society’ (Loew 2013:8). The ‘ethnic dimension’ of decentralisation in Kosovo, reflected in 
the creation of the new Serb-majority municipalities, appears to have worked against 
strengthening inter-ethnic contact and cooperation (Loew 2013). This situation is compounded by 
the country’s dependence on international aid, Belgrade’s continued funding of parallel 
institutions for Kosovo’s Serb community, high unemployment rates and a weak civil society 
(especially at the local level outside of the capital Pristina) and media (which locally depends on 
contracts with the municipalities and in the capital is often controlled by the political parties).xxvii  
 
It is thus not surprising that there has been very little by way of citizen-led initiatives to hold 
decision-makers to account since Kosovo declared independence in 2008, including initiatives 
that would have spanned the persisting ethnic divides. While some civil society groups have 
sporadically voiced demands for better public services, such as in the spring of 2013 in relation to 
the high cost of electricity, these initiatives did not endure. They also did not reach much beyond 
Pristina and involve both Albanian and Serb communities. Regardless of their ethnic identity, 
Kosovars have mostly focused on dealing with the many problems that affect their daily lives, 
such as finding jobs and accessing education and health services. Even when citizens have 
initiated a campaign this has tended to be focused on resolving a specific issue, not to push for the 
establishment of stronger mechanisms of accountability.xxviii          
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Focusing on the case of Kosovo, in this article we have discussed the challenges of 
decentralisation reforms in peace-building contexts. Our brief review of the literature on 
decentralisation shows that the effective exercise of accountability is a principal requirement for 
decentralisation to achieve its goals of enhancing socioeconomic development, improving public 
service delivery and promoting the basic principles of democratic governance at the local level. 
Yet in many developing countries where decentralisation reforms have been implemented the 
institutional, political and social conditions for the exercise of accountability are not given or only 
to a limited extent. While social or citizen-led accountability initiatives – as distinct from formal 
or state-driven accountability mechanisms like elections and institutional checks and balances – 
have emerged and are being promoted in response to this problem, there is no consensus among 
scholars regarding the impact of such initiatives on local governance, public service delivery and 
development. It is also not yet fully understood why social accountability initiatives emerge in 
some contexts and not in others and how their emergence is related to the supply of accountability 
by the state. 
 
Given these significant questions and uncertainties about the inter-relationship between 
decentralisation and accountability, we have posited that it is puzzling that decentralisation has 
also been promoted quite widely as a tool to consolidate peace and re-build states in countries 
emerging from violent conflict. We suggest that in such settings the exercise of accountability is 
even more challenging than in non-conflict, ‘normal’ development contexts, not least because of 
the presence of international stabilization and peace-building missions which, if at all, tend to be 
only marginally accountable to the governments of their host countries, let alone to their citizens.  
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Our discussion of the case of Kosovo suggests that decentralisation and the creation of 
municipalities with special competencies for ethnic minority groups, including Serbs, has been 
quite successful in terms of mitigating ethnic tensions and preventing the resurgence of violence 
after independence in 2008. But decentralisation has contributed little to enhancing cooperation 
and trust between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb communities for the thrust of the international 
peace-building strategy has been to accommodate (i.e. separate administratively and territorially) 
rather than integrate the different ethnic communities (we refer to this as the ‘political’ dimension 
of decentralisation). This situation has been compounded by some of the characteristics of what 
we have called the ‘functional’ dimension of decentralisation, particularly in respect to the 
powers assigned to the municipal mayors vis-à-vis the central government and the municipal 
assemblies, and the associated lack of accountability of the mayors vis-à-vis local populations.  
 
In the absence of stronger accountability mechanisms the prospects for improving local 
governance and service delivery as well as establishing cooperation, dialogue and trust between 
the Albanian majority and the Serb minority are slim. On both sides the perception prevails that 
in the new state public institutions do not function in an accountable and transparent way, the rule 
of law is not being upheld, and common citizens are dependent on the favours they receive from 
local patrons who are locked into patronage relationships with their bosses in Pristina or 
Belgrade. We suggest that this undercuts any incentives that might exist on the part of the two 
communities to cooperate across ethnic lines and engage in joint initiatives to demand 
accountability from decision-makers and political leaders at the local and national levels. The fact 
that there have been only a few localized, short-lived and issue-based citizen initiatives in this 
respect appears to reflect this bleak reality. 
 
Looking ahead, more research needs to be undertaken on how accountability mechanisms, both 
formal and social, could be strengthened in Kosovo in order to make decentralisation work and 
deliver on its goals of both improving local governance and service delivery and consolidating 
peace. The case of Kosovo stands to offer valuable insights into how the complex issues of 
decentralisation and accountability could be addressed in more effective and less harmful ways in 
other (future) peace-building contexts, and it would be useful to include it in comparative cross-
country analyses.    
                    
 
References 
 
Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2006) ‘The Rise of Local Governments: An Overview’, in P. 
Bardhan and D. Mookherjee (eds) (2006) Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing 
Countries. A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Mass. And London: The MIT Press, 1-52. 
 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V. (2003) ‘Democratic Decentralisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, in S. Bastina 
and R. Luckham (eds) (2003), Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice 
in Conflict-Torn Societies, London and New York: Zed Books, 277-302.  
Brinkerhoff, D. (2011) ‘State Fragility and Governance: Conflict Mitigation and Subnational 
Perspectives’, in Development Policy Review, 29:2, pp. 131-153. 
Caplan, R. (c2005) ‘Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, Oxford: Department of Politics and International Relations. 
13 
 
Cheema, G. (2007) ‘Devolution with Accountability: Learning from Good Practices’, in G. 
Cheema and D. Rondinelli (eds) (2007) Decentralizing Governance. Emerging Concepts and 
Practices, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 170-188.  
 
Cheema, G. and Rondinelli, D. (eds) (2007) ‘From Government Decentralization to Decentralized 
Governance’, in G. Cheema and D. Rondinelli (eds) (2007) Decentralizing Governance. 
Emerging Concepts and Practices, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1-20.   
 
Democracy for Development Institute (2013) ‘A Class of Its Own. Patronage and its impact on 
social mobility in Kosovo’, Pristina: Democracy for Development Institute. 
European Commission (2011), Progress Report on Kosovo; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ks_rapport_2011_en.pd
f 
Joshi, A. and Houtzager, P. (2012), ‘Widgets or Watchdogs?’, in Public Management Review, 
14:2, pp. 145-162. 
IKS (2010), ‘Untying the Knot: The Political Economy of Corruption and Accountability in 
Kosovo’, Pristina. 
Joshi, A. (2008), ‘Producing Social Accountability? The Impact of Service Delivery Reforms’, in 
IDS Bulletin, vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 10-17. 
 
KLGI (2014) ‘Clientelsim: The alternative dimension to Kosovo’s governance, Pristina: KLGI. 
 
Lakhani, S. (2013) ‘Extractive Industries and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan. The Role of Social 
Accountability’, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Special Report. 
 
Loew, D. (2013) ‘Decentralisation as a Model for Conflict Transformatiojn: The Case of 
Kosovo’, CCS Working Paper No. 16, Marburg: Center for Conflict Studies/Phillipps Universität 
Marburg. 
 
Paris, R. (2004) At War’s End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Peruzzotti, E. and Smulovitz, C. (2006) ‘Social Accountability. An Introduction’, University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Roeder, D. and Rothchild, P. (2005) ‘Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies’, in D. 
Roeder and P. Rothchild (eds) (2005) Sustainable Peace. Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1-26. 
 
Schultze-Kraft, M. and Morina, E. (2012) ‘Supporting Kosovo’s Transition: An Assessment of 
SDC’s Support to Decentralisation, State-building and Democracy Promotion’, Brighton: 
Institute of Development Studies.  
 
Scott, Z. (2009) ‘Decentralisation, Local Development and Social Cohesion: An Analytical 
Review’, GSDRC Research Paper, Birmingham: International Development Department.  
 
14 
 
Smith, B. (1985) Decentralisation. The Territorial Dimension of the State, London: George Allan 
and Unwin. 
UBO Consulting (2011), Strengthening Local Governance in Kosovo. An Assessment Study on 
the Association of Kosovo Municipalities.  
UNDP (2010) ‘Fostering Social Accountability: From Principle to Practice. Guidance Note, Oso: 
UNDP/Oslo Governance Centre.  
 
Visoka, G. (2012) ‘The ‘Kafkaesque Accountability’ of International Governance in Kosovo’, 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6:2, 189-212. 
 
Laws 
 
Law on Local Self-Government (LLSG), March 2008. 
 
Law on Local Elections (LLE), March 2008. 
 
Law on Administrative Municipal Boundaries (LAMB), March 2008. 
 
Law on Local Government Finance (LLGF), March 2008. 
 
                                                 
i Fellow, Governance Research Team, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex 
ii Independent, Pristina-based consultant and co-founder of the Prishtina Council on Foreign Relations.  
iii We define the term accountability as referring to ‘the various norms, practices, and institutions whose 
purpose is to hold public officials (and other bodies) answerable for their actions and for the outcomes of 
those actions. [...] Vertical accountability pertains to the relationship between entities of unequal ‘rank’, such 
as a government to its citizens or an employer to his or her employees. Horizontal accountability concerns 
the relationship among entities of equal ‘rank’, such as the independent pillars of a government or society 
(for example, the courts or media vis-à-vis the executive)’ (Caplan, c2005:2-3). 
iv One often-cited example in this respect – strongly reminiscent of the experience in Kosovo, which is 
discussed in this article - is Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) after the 1992-1995 war involving Bosnian Muslims, 
Croats and Serbs. As Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic writes, ‘the lines of division between BiH’s three main ethnic 
communities, which were created through conflict, have not softened despite elaborate power-sharing 
schemes. Disintegrative forces remained strong, and ethnically motivated violence, although sporadic, has 
continued (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2003:288). What is more, ‘in BiH, decentralisation has been perceived as an 
opportunity to weaken the state; power sharing based on the primacy of ethnic affiliation has thus, in effect, 
reinforced centrifugal tendencies rather than provided a framework for multi-ethnic cohabitation’ (Bojicic-
Dzelilovic 2003:300-301). 
v As of February 2014, five EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) and 86 UN 
member states (out of 193) had not recognized Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state. 
vi Among the key provisions contained in the bilateral agreement of April 2013 are: (a) the creation of an 
association of Serb-majority municipalities that shall be similar in terms of structure and functions to the 
Association of Kosovo Municipalities (AKM) and shall have a representative role vis-à-vis the central 
government authorities; (b) the police in northern Kosovo shall be integrated into the Kosovo Police; (c) 
members of other Serbian security structures in northern Kosovo shall be offered a place in equivalent 
Kosovo structures; (d) there shall be a regional police commander for the four northern Serb-majority 
municipalities who shall be a Kosovo Serb; (e) the judicial authorities in the northern Serb-majority 
municipalities shall be integrated and operate within Kosovo’s legal framework; and (f) municipal elections 
shall be organized and held in the northern municipalities in 2013. 
vii Authors’ interviews, government, political opposition, NGO and international donor representatives, 
Pristina, 22-24 April 2013.  
viii Authors’ interview, senior international donor official, Pristina, 15 February 2012. 
ix This section draws heavily on the authors’ assessment report of the Swiss Development Cooperation’s 
decentralisation, state-building and democracy promotion portfolio in Kosovo (Schultze-Kraft and Morina 
2012).  
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
x More research is needed to establish why the office of the mayor was given such extensive powers and 
what the rationale of the international community might have been to support the design of legislation to that 
effect.    
xi See list of ‘own competencies’ in LLSG, article 17. 
xii See list of ‘delegated competencies’ in LLSG, article 18.  
xiii Each municipality functions as a single electoral district. Candidates for mayor of a municipality are 
elected if they receive more than 50% plus one vote of the total valid votes cast in that municipality. If none 
of the candidates receives more than 50% plus one vote a run-off election will be held. The candidate who 
wins the majority of votes in the second round is elected mayor. Law on Local Elections, article 9.  
xiv Strengthening Local Governance in Kosovo. An Assessment Study on the Association of Kosovo 
Municipalities. November 2011, p. 11. 
xv For instance, in 2011 AKM made significant proposals in the process of amending the Laws on Public 
Private Partnership, Forestry, Public Enterprises and Waste (AKM, 2011: 2-3). 
xvi A local expert in decentralisation and local governance pointed out that this politicization could be 
observed with respect to the amendment of the Law on Publicly Owned Enterprises and the transfer of 
competencies to manage public enterprises, such as waste collection, to the municipalities. Authors’ 
interview with a representative of the Kosovo Local Government Institute, Pristina, 16 February 2012.  
xvii In Peja municipality, for instance, we found that the mayor is commonly referred to as ‘president’ and the 
chair of the municipal assembly told the authors that citizens would often confuse the roles of mayor and 
chair of the municipal assembly, believing that the mayor also served as the chair of the municipal 
assembly. Authors’ interviews, senior local government officials, Peja, 21 February 2012.  
xviii Authors’ interviews, NGO and international donor representatives, Pristina, 22, 24 April 2013. 
xix Authors’ interviews, CSO representatives, Viti and Peja, 14 and 21 February 2012. 
xx Authors’ interviews, government, political opposition, NGO and international donor representatives, 
Pristina, 22-24 April 2013; authors’ interviews, NGO and international donor representatives, Pristina, 14-18 
April 2014.]  
xxi Authors’ interview, senior government official, Pristina, 24 April 2013. 
xxii Authors’ interviews, NGO and international donor representatives, Pristina, 14-18, April 2014.  
xxiii Authors’ interviews, NGO and international donor representatives, Pristina 14-16 April 2014. 
xxiv Authors’ interviews, NGO representatives, Pristina 14 and 16, April 2014. 
xxv Authors’ interviews, academic researcher and donor representative, Pristina, 23 and 24 April 2013. 
Authors’ interviews, NGO representatives, Pristina, 14 and 16 April, 2014.  
xxvi Authors’ interviews, NGO representatives, Pristina, 14 and 16 April 2014. 
xxvii Authors’ interviews, NGO and donor representatives, Pristina, 14-18 April 2014. 
xxviii Authors’ interviews, NGO and donor representatives, Pristina, 14-18 April 2014. 
